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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant (hereinafter "Korn") lived in the City of Nampa, Canyon County, State of 
Idaho prior to April of 2006. (Mot. Tr., pp. 5-6). While in Canyon County, Korn operated a zoo 
at 1506 Happy Valley Road. Id. The zoo had an extensive collection of animals including 
cranes, camels, zebras, exotic porcupines and tigers. (Mot. Tr., p. 7, L. 13-21). In 2002, Korn's 
wife, Susan, moved from the Nampa property. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, L. 5-6). At that time, Susan 
changed the addresses on the permits that Korn required to operate his zoo without Korn's 
knowledge. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, L. 5-13). As a result, Korn did not receive the necessary permit 
notices and he Jost his permits to operate the zoo. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, 1, 14-18). 
In August of 2004, Susan filed rape charges against Korn. (Mot. Tr., p. 8, L. 22-25). The 
rape charges were ultimately dismissed. (Mot. Tr., p. 37, L. 2-11). As a result of the false 
charges, Korn was removed from the Nampa property. (Mot. Tr., p. 9, L. 1-3). When Korn was 
again allowed back on the Nampa property, he discovered that several of the zoo animals were 
missing. (Mot. Tr., p. 9, L. 10-19). 
During 2004, Korn was involved in divorce litigation with Susan. (Mot Tr., p. 9, L. 17-
19). In the divorce case, Korn was ordered to remove the zoo animals from the Nampa property. 
In November or December of 2004, Korn filed for bankruptcy protection. (Mot. Tr., p. 
10, L. 1-7). In the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, a development company named DDR 
purchased the real property in Nampa where Korn had maintained his zoo. (Mot. Tr., p. 10, L. 8-
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21). When DDR purchased the Nampa property, Korn started looking for alternative placement 
for the zoo animals. (Mot. Tr., p. 11, L. 16-25). Korn spoke with representatives from the Boise 
zoo about placing the animals, but the Boise zoo was not interested. (Mot. Tr., p. 11, L. 19-20). 
Korn also looked for alternative placement for the animals in Owyhee County, Canyon County, 
Boise County, and Payette County. (Mot. Tr., p. 12, L. 16-19). Ultimately, Korn decided to 
relocate the animals to a property in Payette County (the "County"). (Mot. Tr., p. 13, L. 2-15). 
At the time Korn decided to move the animals to the County, he checked the Payette 
County ordinances with his realtor. (Mot. Tr., p. 14, L. 18-22). At that time, there was no 
ordinance on the books that prohibited the housing of exotic animals in the County. (Mot., Tr., 
p. 14, L. 23-25). 
Since Korn was in bankruptcy, he entered into a contract with his mother and DDR to 
move the animals and house them in the County. Pursuant to the agreement, Korn's mother 
would purchase the Payette County real property and invest $30,000 towards moving the animals 
and building facilities for the animals in the County, and DDR would give Korn $50,000 to help 
move the animals and construct facilities for the animals. (Mot. Tr., p. 15, L. 5-11 ). In exchange 
DDR could take possession of the Nampa property more quickly and begin developing the 
property for commercial use. As the project proceeded in the County, DDR put even more funds 
into the Payette County facility, ultimately expending approximately $600,000.00. (Mot. Tr., p. 
19, L. 14-19). 
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While the Payette County facilities were being constructed, Korn was visited by a Payette 
County Employee by the last name of Dressen. (Mot. Tr., p. 16, L. 2-5). Mr. Dressen advised 
Korn that he needed to apply for a permit to build on the Payette County property. (Mot. Tr., p. 
16, L. 8-12). Korn paid and applied for a site permit to continue his construction in the County. 
(Mot. Tr., p. I 6, L. 14-15). 
During the construction of the Payette County facilities, the Payette County 
Commissioners passed an ordinance making it illegal to possess exotic animals in the County. 
(Mot, Tr., p. I 7, L. 17-23).1 By the time Korn was advised of the new ordinance, it was too late 
to build a facility to house the animals someplace else. (Mot. Tr., p. 19, L. 7-10). Further, Korn 
had been ordered by the Federal Bankruptcy Judge to move and Korn had been advised that ifhe 
did not get the animals moved he would be in contempt of the Bankruptcy Court's orders. (Mot. 
Tr., p. 18, L. 11-18). 
The County filed charges against Korn for violating the newly enacted exotic animal 
ordinance known as Payette County Ordinance 5-6-2, and for violating LC. § 25-3905 and 
IDAPA 02.04.27.111. (See Criminal Complaint). Korn brought a pretrial Motion to Dismiss the 
count brought against him for violating the Payette County ordinance on the grounds that the 
County's enactment of the ordinance violated the contract clause of the Idaho and U.S. 
1In the Commissioner's Meeting Minutes, which were admitted at the hearing on Korn's 
Motion to Dismiss, it states that the reason for the ordinance is that "there is a man wanting to 
bring exotic animals to a place on Little Willow." In other words, the ordinance was enacted 
specifically to affect Korn. 
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Constitutions. The Court heard Korn's Motion to Dismiss on August 4, 2006, and denied the 
same. (Mot. Tr., p. 39-40. 
The cause proceeded to jury trial on August 24, 2006. (Trial Tr., p. 1 ). During the course 
of the trial, and during the cross-examination of Korn, the Prosecutor gave Korn a copy of an 
order from the Bankruptcy Court. (Trial Tr., p. 155-159). The Prosecutor asked Korn questions 
about the order and both Korn and the Prosecutor read portions of the order to the jury. Id. On 
redirect, defense counsel attempted to introduce the bankruptcy court orders, both the one 
discussed by the Prosecutor and another one, into evidence. (Trial Tr., p. 166-168). The 
Prosecutor objected on the basis that the orders were not certified and the trial court sustained the 
Prosecutor's objections. Id. 
Ultimately, the jury found Korn guilty on both counts, Korn was sentenced and appealed 
to the District Court for the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Payette. That appeal 
was denied in an Appellate Decision by District Judge Renae J. Hoff, filed on December 12, 
2007. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial Court err by applying the wrong legal standard in denying Korn's pretrial 
Motion to Dismiss? 
2. Did the trial Court err by failing to allow the admission of the bankruptcy court orders 




There are two issues on appeal and they will be address in turn. 
A. DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Korn filed a Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint which alleged a violation of the 
Payette County Ordinance 5-6-2 prohibiting the possession of exotic animals (the "Ordinance"). 
Korn argued that the passing of the Ordinance after he had entered into an agreement with his 
mother and DDR (an agreement that was ratified by the bankruptcy court) to house the animals in 
the County violated the contract clause of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court exercises free review over constitutional issues as they are purely 
issues oflaw. Meisner v. Potlach Corp., 131 Idaho 258,260,954 P.2d 676,678 (1998). "In an 
appeal from a final judgment of a magistrate judge following an appeal to a district jude sitting as 
an appellate court, we [ the Supreme Court] review the record of the magistrate judge 
independently of the decision of the district judge." State v. Anderson, 2008 Idaho 34411 
(Supreme Court 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
2. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
The Idaho Constitution provides that, "[n]o ... law impairing the obligation of contracts 
will ever be passed." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 16 (Lexis 2006). The U.S. Constitution provides 
that, "[nJo state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts .... " U.S. Const. 
Art. I, § 10 (Lexis 2006). These clauses are known as the contract clauses. 
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The Idaho Courts have historically recognized and enforced the provisions of the contract 
clause. See e.g., Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993); Steward v. Nelson, 54 Idaho 
437, 32 P.2d 843 (1934). In conducting an analysis under the Contract Clause, the Court must 
first determine "'whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship."' Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 
400, 411 (1983) (internal citations omitted). "Any enactment of a legislative character is said to 
'impair' the obligation of a contract which attempts to take from a party a right to which he is 
entitled by its terms, or which deprives him of the means of enforcing such a right .... " Curr, 
124 Idaho at 692, 864 P.2d at 138. If the State's regulation constitutes a substantial impairment 
on a party's contract rights, then the State must justify its actions by showing that there is a 
"significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation." Energy Reserves Grp., Inc., 
459 U.S. at 411. "[T]he next inquiry is whether the adjustments of 'the rights and responsibilities 
of contracting parties [is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to 
the public purpose justifying [the legislation's] adoption."' Id at 412. Finally, in Sanderson v. 
Salmon River Canal Co., 45 Idaho 244 (1927), at 256, the Supreme Court held that "the general 
rule would seem to be that a statute which does not act on the contract itself but merely on the 
property which is the subject of the contract may not be said to impair the obligation of the 
contract. The value of the contract may be diminished, but the obligation of the parties to each 
other is not affected in the slightest degree[.] (internal citations omitted) Nor does every statute 
which affects the value of a contract impair its obligation. It is one of the contingencies to which 
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parties look now in making a large class of contracts that they may be affected in many ways by 
state and national legislation." 
3. ANALYSIS 
The trial court denied Korn's Motion to Dismiss and ruled as follows: 
In your motion to dismiss, you cited Energy Reserves Group versus Canada Power 
and Light, 459 US 400. And that case states that first, whether state law has in 
fact operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship and 
assuming all the evidence that you presented is correct, that it's true, there may 
possibly be an impairment of a contractual relationship and I'm not ruling on 
whether or not that's a legal relationship or that contract is valid or not. But then 
Energy Resources goes on to say if a substantial impairment is found, the State 
justification must have a significant legitimate public purpose behind the 
regulation. It's clear to me that Payette County has a significant and legitimate 
public purposes behind the regulation of exotic animals. Contrary to what Mr. 
Korn may assert, it's clear that exotic animals can be dangerous. And they - and 
the county certainly has a legitimate public purpose in their regulation. 
Furthermore, under Kerr versus Kerr, 124 Idaho 686, specifically in footnote 3, 
the Idaho Supreme Court said that impairment of a contract is an intent by the 
state to take from a party the right to which he is entitled to by its terms or which 
deprives him of the means of enforcing such right. I cannot find, as a matter of 
law, that Mr. Korn is entitled to keep exotic animals in Payette County. He has to 
have permits from the State. He has to have permits from the federal government. 
He doesn't have any of those permits. I fail to see that anything that Payette 
County did is an impairment of any contract whatsoever. Based on that and based 
on Energy Resource Group versus Kansas Power and Light and Kerr versus Kerr, 
the Court's denying the motion to dismiss. 
(Mot. Tr., pp. 39-40). 
The trial court's analysis does not follow the analysis set forth by the appellate courts as 
outlined above. In a contract clause analysis, the first step is for the Court to determine whether 
the Ordinance substantially impairs a contractual relationship. In this case, Korn had a 
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contractual right to have his mother and DDR construct a facility for the animals and house them 
in the County. While the facility was being built, and after issuing Korn a site permit for the 
building, the County enacted an ordinance that made the facility worthless to Korn since he could 
not house his animals there. In effect the County deprived Korn of the benefit of a $600,000.00 
facility which could not be duplicated due to orders of the federal Bankruptcy Court that ratified 
Korn's, his mother's and DDR's agreement initially. It is clear that the answer to the first step of 
the contract clause analysis is that the County substantially impaired Korn's contractual rights. 
The argument that Korn had no legal right to said contract due to the lack of appropriate state and 
federal permits is irrelevant since the Ordinance at issue makes no exception for the possession 
of such permits and the lack of such permits is not an element of the crime. As the trial Judge's 
jury instructions make clear, the lack of the possession of any such permit is not an element of 
the crime charged and moved under the Motion to Dismiss, the violation of Payette County 
Ordinance 5-6-2, but rather is for the other charged crime, the violation of Idaho Code Section 
25-3905. (Trial Tr., p. 180-187) 
The further argument that Korn' s contract rights were not substantially impaired under 
the standard articulated in Sanderson, is not applicable here. Sanderson dealt with a lien placed 
on land for water right payments that took priority over, but did not vitiate, the complainant's 
mortgage rights on said lands. The statute at issue here placed no burden on the land, but rather 
flatly denied Korn the right to keep the animals on the property for which he had entered into his 
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various contracts, making the contracts and the property improvements with respect to the land 
essentially worthless. 
At this point the burden shifts to the County to show a significant and legitimate public 
purpose behind the regulation. The County indicates that there is a significant and legitimate 
public purpose served by the Ordinance in that the ordinance protects people from dangerous 
exotic animals. The problem with this assertion is that the testimony at the hearing on the 
Motion to Dismiss indicated that the animals were not dangerous and no evidence was presented 
by the County to show otherwise. Further, the minutes from the Payette County Commissioner's 
meetings make it clear that this Ordinance was designed to keep Korn out of the County. There 
is no indication that there had been any problems with exotic animals in the County. In fact, 
Korn testified at the hearing that other people in the County had previously possessed exotic 
animals including an alligator (Mot. Tr., p. 37, L. 8-21), emus, rheas, ostriches, python, goboon 
vipers, womas, blackheads, green bum, and other poisonous or "hot" reptiles. (Mot. Tr., p. 3 7-
38). The trial court jumped to a conclusion not based upon the evidence presented at the hearing 
and concluded that Kom's animals "can be dangerous." The trial court ignored, however, the fact 
that the Ordinance was enacted to address Korn coming into the county and there was no proof 
that Korn's animals were dangerous or that the animals addressed in the ordinance were 
dangerous. Accordingly, the County failed to establish a significant and legitimate interest in 
enacting the Ordinance. Specifically, the trial court found as a fact that the County had a 
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significant and legitimate interest in regulating the animals at issue here without any evidence in 
the record to support that finding and said finding should be overturned as clearly erroneous. 
Even if the County had established a significant and legitimate interest, the County's 
actions in enacting the Ordinance affected the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties 
in a way that is not based upon reasonable conditions. Further, the Ordinance's effects were not 
of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the Ordinance's adoption. In other 
words, the County could have enacted an Ordinance that provided for guidelines that Korn would 
have to follow to keep the animals in the County. By doing so, Korn would have been able to 
enjoy the benefits of his agreement and the County could still regulate the animals and protect the 
citizens of the County. 
B. DENIAL OF ADMISSION OF APPELLANT'S BANKRUPTCY ORDERS WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
During the course of the jury trial, one of the issues was whether or not the Bankruptcy 
Court had ordered Korn to move to the County. If so, Korn would have acted out of necessity 
and could not have been found guilty of the alleged violations of law. Korn attempted to prove 
that he had been ordered to move to the County by introducing two Bankruptcy Court orders into 
evidence, to wit: defense Exhibits E and F. The Prosecutor objected to the admission of the 




1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court should" ... only disturb a trial court's discretion to admit evidence ... 
upon 'a clear showing of abuse."' State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911 (2003) (citations 
omitted). "Even if the [trial] court used its discretion in error, such error, alone, does not 
constitute grounds for reversal." Id "Unless an error 'affects substantial rights' of the parties it 
should be disregarded." Id. (citations omitted). "An error is harmless if the [appellate] Court is 
unable to say, 'beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result 
absent the error.' The burden of showing prejudicial error rests on the party asserting such error." 
Id. 
2. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD 
"Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of evidence before 
them." Sandoval-Tena, at 911. 
"Physical items ... must be authenticated before they may be admitted into evidence. Rule 
901 provides that '[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent 
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question 
is what its proponent claims.' Further Rule 901 provides that, authentication may be presented, 
for example, through the testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is 
claimed to be." Alderson v. Bonner, 142 Idaho 733, 738 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations 
omitted). A copy of a court order does not have to be certified in order to be admitted into 
evidence. If a court order is certified it is self authenticating and does not require further 
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evidentiary foundation to prove what it is. I.RE. 902( 4) (Lexis 2006). However, authentication 
may be accomplished in other ways. "The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
the matter in question is what its proponent claims." I.R.E. 901(a) (Lexis 2006). "By way of 
illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or 
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule ... [t]estimony of a witness with 
knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be." I.R.E. 901(b)(l) (Lexis 2006). 
Proof of a chain of custody is not a separate requirement for admissibility. State v. Fee, 
124 Idaho 170, 175 (Ct. App. 1993). "Ordinarily, the party offering an exhibit establishes its 
chain of custody in order to create a presumption that it was not materially altered. If the chain 
of custody has been broken, however, the party can still rely upon other evidence to show a lack 
of material alteration." State v. Crook, 98 Idaho 383, 384 (1977). The standard for admissibility 
of evidence is whether the trial court can determine, in all reasonable probability, the proffered 
exhibit has not been changed in any material respect. State v. Kodesh, 122 Idaho 756, 757 
(1992). Generally, in laying a proper foundation for admission of evidence the practicalities of 
proof do not require the prosecution to negate all possibilities of substitution or tampering. 
Dach/et v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 756 (2002). 
3.ANALYSIS 
Korn attempted to enter into evidence two Exhibits, specifically Defense Exhibits E and 
F, which are orders from the Bankmptcy Court and which were necessary to provide the evidence 
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to support Korn's defense claim that he was acting, in moving the animals at issue in this case to 
the County, by necessity. 
In the case of Exhibit E, Korn was asked if he recognized it while testifying and he said 
"Yes, sir." (Trial Tr., pp 165-166). There was no evidence of any kind introduced to call into 
question his identification of the document. It clearly, under the standard of Kodesh and I.R.E. 
90l(b)(l), should have been admitted into evidence. The next question is whether such error is 
harmless. I will address that question for both documents at the end of this section. 
In the case of Exhibit F, there was a great deal of testimony by Korn about the document. 
While it is true that when asked about Exhibit F by the Prosecutor, Korn said, "Sir, I saw so 
many of those, I honestly don't know which one it is you have," (Trial Tr., p. 156) he had not yet 
been shown the document. The Prosecutor did not seek leave to approach Korn and show him 
Exhibit F until after that exchange. (Trial Tr., p. 156) Once Mr. Korn was shown the document 
and asked by his own Attorney what it was, he readily identified it, (Trial Tr., p. 167-168) 
thereby providing a proper authentication under the standard of Kodesh and I.R.E. 901(b)(J). 
Further, the Prosecutor elicited lengthy testimony from Korn about Exhibit F (see Trial Tr., pp. 
155-159), and during said testimony the Prosecutor asserted various things about Exhibit F, such 
as "I don't see where it orders you to move to Payette County" (Trial Tr., p. 156), "You're not 
ordered to do anything there" (Trial Tr., p. 157) and "That order authorizes the release of funds. 
It does not say those animals shall be removed to Payette County. At least I don't read that." 
(Trial Tr., p. 158). Such lengthy testimony, elicited by the Prosecutor and including various 
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assertions about the document, should be sufficient to provide proper authentication under the 
standard of Kodesh and I.R.E. 90l(b)(l). 
In the case of Exhibit E, the jury heard Korn testify to its title, source and subject. (Trial 
Tr., p. 166). With respect to Exhibit F, the jury heard a great deal of testimony by Korn as to it, 
as well as a great many Prosecutorial assertions as to what it was. (Trial Tr., pp. 155-159). While 
the jury was able to hear some short statements by Korn with respect to Exhibit E's nature and 
the lengthier colloquy about Exhibit F, it is a very different level of proof to hear a defendant 
stating something and to be handed a written court order which says the same thing or something 
similar. While a jury may question the validity of the verbal testimony of a defendant, especially 
when the prosecutor makes assertions about the Exhibit, during his cross-examination, that tend 
to call into question the accuracy of the defendant's testimony, they will not so question an order 
by a court. Korn was simply unable to make a convincing claim of necessity when he was not 
allowed to introduce into evidence the very documents that were the cause of the claim, though 
properly authenticated, while simultaneously having his claim about those documents challenged 
by the Prosecutor during cross-examination. In such a situation, the error can not be harmless 
and the standard of Sandoval-Tena, at 911, is met. The Court simply can not say beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same conclusion absent the error. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to properly analyze the evidence and apply the proper legal standard 
of analysis of the contract clause claim made by Korn in his Motion to Dismiss. Given the 
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significant impairment of Korn's contract rights with his mother and DDR, the lack of any 
evidence of any kind to support a finding of a significant and legitimate reason for the County to 
impair his contract rights, and the entire lack of any analysis of any kind with respect to the 
reasonableness of the County's legal enactment and enforcement, this Court should find that 
Korn' s contract rights have been violated and reverse the trial court's decision and dismiss Count 
I of the Criminal Complaint herein on constitutional grounds as violations of the Idaho Const. 
Art. I,§ 16 and the U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 10. 
The trial court erred in that it refused the admission of Defense Exhibits E and F, though 
they were properly authenticated and absolutely necessary to Korn successfully making his claim 
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